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Abstract
We analyse the welfare effects of environmental policy arising from the formation of an 
international environmental agreement on the participating and non-participating countries 
and thus shed light on the potential incentives for a country to join such an agreement. 
Within a N-country Q-goods general equilibrium framework under free-trade conditions, 
we consider unilateral and cooperative policy settings and, within the latter, country-spe-
cific and fully harmonized policies within the agreement. A key result of the paper is the 
emergence of a negative relationship, arising from terms of trade effects, between the wel-
fare changes of the participating and non-participating countries following the formation of 
the agreement. These however do not result in a zero sum welfare outcome for the world as 
a whole.
Keywords International environmental agreements · Environmental taxation · International 
trade · Pareto efficiency · Pareto improving reforms · Climate change
JEL Classification Q56 · H23 · F18
1 Introduction
Climate change and the trans-boundary nature of environmental pollutants have drawn the 
attention of academics and policymakers to the interaction between international trade and 
the environment and to the importance of internationally coordinated actions in addressing 
environmental concerns. Since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
in 1972, environmental policy efforts globally have been geared towards finding potential 
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solutions in a multilateral context—through international (IEA) or regional environmental 
agreements (REA).1
The extant theoretical literature suggests that countries may not be willing to adopt 
stricter environmental policy fearing other countries’ free-riding behaviour and/or loss of 
competitiveness – as reflected by the pollution haven hypothesis. One strand of the envi-
ronmental literature suggests that coordinated actions between governments, such as those 
resulting from the formation of environmental agreements, can address these incentive 
issues (see among others Baylis et  al. 2014; Chua 2003). Against this background, it is 
important to shed light on the potential channels that may incentivise countries to join an 
environmental agreement.
In this paper, we conjecture that, by affecting the terms of trade, environmental policy can 
give rise to trade creation and diversion effects that will shape the welfare implications of, 
and the incentives to join, international environmental agreements for the participating and 
non-participating countries. To explore this conjecture, we develop a N-country Q-goods per-
fectly competitive general equilibrium international trade model in which a subset of countries 
form an environmental agreement.2 We assume pollution to be trans-boundary and arising 
from production activities and that governments can affect environmental quality by means of 
an emissions tax. The assumption of free-trade, consistent with WTO objectives, facilitates a 
clearer identification of the various welfare effects emerging solely from environmental policy.
Our results confirm that an important channel for the welfare impact of environmental 
agreements are terms-of-trade induced trade creation and diversion effects. A major con-
tribution of the paper is to show that terms of trade effects are crucial to the emergence of 
a negative relationship between the changes in welfare of signatories and non-signatories 
countries – whereby a Pareto improving environmental policy reform for the former may 
be welfare reducing for the latter. We find however that the overall effects of a change in 
policy within the IEA do not result in a zero sum welfare outcome. Thus, our results sug-
gest that countries participating in an IEA may be able to use their environmental policies 
to manipulate the terms of trade so as to mitigate the negative impact of stricter emission 
control on competitiveness that underpins the pollution haven effects of environmental pol-
icy commonly highlighted by the literature.
The literature addressing environmental policy coordination mainly deals with the char-
acterisation of optimal (first and second best) environmental and/or trade policy (see, e.g., 
Copeland 1994; Neary 2006; Keen and Kotsogiannis 2014; Tsakiris et al. 2014) and policy 
reforms (Turunen-Red and Woodland 2004; Copeland 1994). The welfare consequences of 
policy reforms have mainly been analysed within a purely unilateral (e.g. Markusen 1975; 
Krutilla 1991; Copeland 1994; Hatzipanayotou et  al. 2008; Michael and Hatzipanayotou 
2013; Tsakiris et al. 2014, 2017) or a fully-cooperative (e.g. Keen and Kotsogiannis 2014; 
Kotsogiannis and Woodland 2013; Vlassis 2013) context. To the best of our knowledge, 
the case of partial cooperation among a subset of countries has not been studied within this 
framework.
2 Here we are not concerned with the issue of coalition formation and stability (Finus 2003).
1 The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (www.unep.org) defines Multilateral Environ-
mental Agreements (MEAs) as international agreements between three or more countries (agreements 
between two countries are referred to as “bilateral agreements”) on how to jointly address environmental 
problems of a cross-border nature. Mitchell (2003) surveys multilateral and bilateral environmental agree-
ments to number approximately 700 and over 1000, respectively. Similarly, according to the IEA database 
(http://iea.uoreg on.edu/) there are 1300 MEAs and over 2200 bilateral agreements. The likely relatively 
higher homogeneity and the lower enforcement and coordination costs characterising smaller regions may 
explain the greater ease in forming smaller regional as opposed to larger environmental agreements.
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Alongside the trade theoretic approach within which this paper is developed, a game 
theoretic approach has primarily focused on environmental agreements’ behaviour—from 
their formation, to participation incentives, and to factors contributing to their effective-
ness (for recent reviews of this literature see, among others, Finus and Caparros (2015) and 
Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2016)).3 More recently, Al Khourdajie and Finus (2020) focus 
on the role of trade instruments, in the form of Border Tax Adjustment (BCA), in offset-
ting countries’ incentives to free ride in an IEA. In line with our results, this strand of the 
literature implies that terms of trade effects can potentially incentivise countries to join an 
IEA. While the game theoretic approach can study IEA behavioural aspects in a partially 
cooperative framework, it does not capture general equilibrium effects and is limited in its 
ability to characterise optimal policies and reforms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 
derives and discusses the optimal unilateral and cooperative environmental policy in the 
absence and presence of an International Environmental Agreement. Section 4 determines 
the relationship between the welfare changes of the participating and non-participating 
countries. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2  The Model
We adopt a standard perfectly competitive general equilibrium international trade model 
characterised by N large open economies each producing and trading Q goods under condi-
tions of free-trade.4 Pollution emissions are a by-product of production and are assumed 
to affect the representative consumer’s welfare directly, whilst having no effect on the 
production capabilities of firms.5 Factors of production are assumed to be internationally 
immobile and inelastically supplied. In what follows, superscripts and subscripts refer to 
the country and partial derivatives, respectively.
The vector of world prices is denoted by p and country j’s Q-dimensional vector of 
emissions is denoted by zj . Pollution is assumed to be trans-boundary; thus, global pollu-
tion is the sum of all countries’ emissions:
(1)k =
N∑
j=1
휃j�zj,
3 Papers focusing on issues of enforcement and on the size of IEAs (Hoel 1992; Barrett 1994; Eichner 
and Pethig 2013) tend towards a pessimistic outlook about the stability of large IEAs. When IEA games 
include environmental or trade policy options (e.g., Eichner and Pethig 2015; Dong and Zhao 2009; Finus 
and Rundshagen 2000), the results regarding participation and cooperation are mixed. In addition, there is a 
significant portion of the game theory literature that highlights the role of trade sanctions in increasing the 
stability of cooperation among countries (e.g., Hoel and Schneider 1997; Carraro et al. 2006; Barrett 1995, 
1997).
4 The basic framework of analysis relies on that developed by  Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004) 
and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014). Our focus differs in that we consider partial cooperation, among a sub-
set of countries, instead of full cooperation and we do not impose any restriction on trade – in line with 
WTO objectives (GATT article I and II). This allows us to analyse and isolate the effects of international 
environmental agreements on the welfare of both participating and non-participating countries.
5 See Copeland (1994) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
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where the parameters in vector 휃j denote the perfect or partial trans-boundary nature of 
pollution. In general 휃jq ≤ 1 ; for simplicity, and without loss of generality, we shall assume 
that 휃jq = 1 for all qs and let 휃j = i , where i represents the N-vector of 1s. Prime indicates 
transposition.
Country j’s consumer preferences are described by the expenditure function:
which represents the minimum cost of achieving the utility level ũj given international 
prices p and aggregate pollution level k. Utility depends positively on consumption x and 
negatively on emissions k. The expenditure function is concave and linear homogeneous in 
prices and is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable. By Shephard’s Lemma, the 
Hicksian compensated demand vector is represented by ejp and the consumer’s marginal 
willingness to pay for pollution abatement is given by ej
k
 , while eju > 0 denotes the inverse 
of the marginal utility of income. An increase in the level of any pollutant would require 
an increase in consumption to compensate the consumer for the disutility from pollution; 
thus, expenditure is increasing in k, implying ej
k
> 0 . The matrix ejpp gives the consump-
tion substitution effects and is negative semidefinite. The sensitivity of (compensated) con-
sumption demand to pollution emissions is given by ej
pk
.6 Additionally, we follow most of 
the literature (e.g., Keen and Kotsogiannis 2014; Antoniou et al. 2019) in assuming that the 
marginal utility of income is independent of prices, i.e., ejpu = 0.7,8
Each country imposes sector specific emission taxes, denoted by the vector sj.9 In each 
sector, firms maximise revenue by choosing a feasible combination of emission ( zj ) and 
output ( yj ) for a given technology tj and vector of endowments (vj) , resulting in the revenue 
function:
The revenue function is convex, homogeneous of degree one in prices and emission taxes 
and is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.10 Hotelling’s Lemma implies that 
the price derivatives of the revenue function give the vector of the net supplies of tradable 
goods yj = gjp . By the envelope property zj = −gjs , i.e. the vector of emissions equals the 
marginal abatement costs.11 Thus, totally differentiating zj , we obtain the effect of the envi-
ronmental policy on emission:
(2)ej(uj, p, k) = minxj{p�xj ∶ uj(xj, k) ≥ ũj},
(3)gj(p, sj, vj) = Maxy,z{p�yj − sj�zj ∶ yj, zj휖 tj(vj)}.
(4)dzj = −(gjssdsj + gjspdpj),
10 For the properties of the revenue function see Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982) and Copeland 
(1994).
11 This, in turn, implies that global pollution can be rewritten as k = −∑N
j=1
i�g
j
s.
6 The elements of the ej
pk
 vector can be positive or negative depending on whether the good’s (compen-
sated) demands and pollution are complements or substitutes in consumption.
7 This assumption can be relaxed without altering the qualitative nature of the results, but at the cost of 
greater analytical complexity.
8 The assumptions regarding the expenditure function are consistent with a quasi-linear utility function of 
the form U(x1, x휄,z) = x1 + V(x휄, z) with 휄 ∈ [2,Q] and where x1 represents the numeraire good.
9 The first tradable good is assumed to be the numeraire which, as is standard in the literature, will also not 
be taxed.
335Welfare and Trade Effects of International Environmental…
1 3
where the first term on the right-hand-side represents the environmental policy’s direct 
effect on production and is positive definite. The second term reflects the indirect effect 
arising from the impact of changes in prices on production; the sign of the elements of this 
matrix depends on the pollution intensity of production.12 Thus, by Eqs. (1) and (4) the 
change in global pollution is given by:
It is assumed that the emission tax revenues are returned to the consumer in a lump-sum 
fashion. Thus, the economy’s aggregate budget constraint is given by:
The market clearing condition requires that the sum of excess demands across the world 
should be equal to zero:
Equations (1), (6), and (7) determine the economy’s equilibrium. The latter will be char-
acterised by Q + N unknowns, namely Q − 1 relative prices, N utility levels and the aggre-
gate pollution level. Correspondingly, we have Q + N + 1 equations of which one can be 
dropped by Walras’ Law.
3  Optimal Environmental Policy
In this section, we analyse environmental policy under different scenarios.
3.1  Optimal policy in the absence of environmental agreements
We start by considering the case in which the emission taxes are set unilaterally or in a 
fully multilateral cooperative setting in the absence of a IEA. Although the results are well 
established in the literature,13 they will offer a useful benchmark for the analysis of interna-
tional environmental agreements.
By differentiating the market clearing condition (7), and making use of (5), we can iden-
tify the effect of the environmental policy on international prices:
(5)dk = −
N∑
j=1
i�(gj
ss
dsj + gj
sp
dp) = −
N∑
j=1
(i�gj
ss
dsj) −
N∑
j=1
(i�gj
sp
dp).
(6)ej(uj, p, k) = gj(p, sj) + sj�zj.
(7)
N∑
j=1
mj =
N∑
j=1
{ej
p
− gj
p
} = 0.
12 Copeland (1994) defines a good to be pollution intensive if 𝜕zi∕𝜕pi > 0 . An increase in the price of good 
i will result in an increase in its output by drawing resources away from the rest of the economy. If, at the 
margin, the expanding part of the economy produces more pollution than the contracting part, the sector 
producing good i is pollution intensive. See also Neary (2006).
13 See, e.g., Markusen (1975), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), Tsakiris et al. (2014), Tsakiris et al. (2017), 
Vlassis (2013), Kotsogiannis and Woodland (2013).
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where
is the pollution augmented world net substitution matrix which is assumed to be of full 
rank and invertible.
Equation (8) reflects the fact that changes in environmental policy affect prices via 
changes in both production levels, 
(
g
j′
psds
j
)
 , and, given the latter’s effect on pollution, con-
sumption levels, 
�∑N
j=1
e
j
pk
�
i�g
j
ssds.
To evaluate the impact of the environmental policy on welfare, we totally differentiate 
the budget constraint in (6) to obtain
The three terms on the right-hand-side of Eq. (10) indicate, respectively, that a change in 
environmental policy affects a country’s welfare via three main channels: (1) “terms of 
trade”, through a direct impact on on trade flows 
(
−mjdp
)
 , and indirect effects on govern-
ment revenue 
(
−sj�g
j
spdp
)
 and global pollution 
�
e
j
k
i�
∑N
휈=1
g휈
sp
�
 ; (2) government revenue 
(sj�g
j
ssds
j) , and (3) global pollution, 
�
e
j
k
i�
∑N
휈=1
�
g휈
ss
ds휈
��
.
In order to derive the optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, we substitute (8) 
into (10) to rewrite the changes in the welfare function as
where
from which the optimal unilateral environmental policy is
(8)dp = Λ−1
N∑
j=1
{[
gj�
ps
+
(
N∑
j=1
e
j
pk
)
i�gj
ss
]
dsj
}
,
(9)Λ =
N∑
j=1
[
ej�
pp
− gj�
pp
−
(
N∑
j=1
e
j
pk
)
i�gj
sp
]
(10)ejuduj =
[
−mj� − sj�gj
sp
+ e
j
k
i�
(
N∑
휈=1
g휈
sp
)]
dp − sj�gj
ss
dsj + e
j
k
i�
N∑
휈=1
(
g휈
ss
ds휈
)
.
(11)ejuduj =
−mj
N∑
휈=1,
(휇휈ds휈)
−sj�
�
g
j
sp
N∑
휈=1,
(휇휈ds휈) + g
j
ssds
j
�
+ e
j
k
i�
N∑
휈=1
�
g휈
ss
+
�
N∑
휈=1
g휈
sp
�
휇휈
�
ds휈 ,
휇휈 = Λ−1
[
g휈
ps
+
(
N∑
j=1
e
j
pk
)
i�g휈
ss
]
,
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where Ωj =
�
mj − e
j
k
�∑N
l=1,l≠j
gl
sp
��
휇j
�
g
j
ss + g
j
sp휇
j
�−1
.14 Consistent with Keen and Kotsogi-
annis (2014), Tsakiris et al. (2014) and Markusen (1975), the optimal unilateral emission 
taxes account for the difference between the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for 
pollution abatement, ej
k
i′ , and the policy’s direct and indirect effect on the terms of trade 
through imports/exports mj and rest of the world emissions ej
k
�∑N
l=1,l≠j
i�g
j
sp
�
 . The term Ωj 
dictates whether the Nash equilibrium emission tax is larger or smaller than the consumer’s 
marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement ej
k
.15 A key difference with the extant 
literature is that, due to the fact that there is only one available policy instrument to address 
two distortions, the terms of trade and emission leakage effects are weighted by the direct 
effect of the policy on emission levels gjss and its indirect effect through prices gjsp.16
The importance of the role of the terms of trade in shaping the policy can be further 
highlighted by considering the small open economy case in which changes in environmen-
tal policy would not affect prices and hence the terms of trade. In addition, changes in 
policy in one country would also not have any international leakage effects affecting pro-
duction and hence pollution in other countries. In this case, it is then easy to show that the 
non-cooperative equilibrium would require each country to equate its environmental tax to 
its consumers’ willingness to pay for pollution abatement, i.e. sj� = ej
k
i�.
Under full cooperation, countries set environmental policy by maximising their joint 
welfare function. As always under cooperation, countries can choose a uniform (i.e. com-
mon) policy or country-specific taxes. In the case of global cooperation, the two coincide. 
To see this, for the case of country-specific taxes, we use the market clearing condition in 
(7) together with the sum of the individual countries’ welfare to write the change in world 
welfare as:17
(12)sj� = ejki� − Ωj ,
14 To see how Eq. (12) is obtained, it proves useful to re-write Eq. (11) as:
ej
u
duj =
[
−mj휇j − sj�
(
gj
sp
휇j + g
j
ss
)
+ e
j
k
i�
(
g
j
ss +
(
N∑
휈=1
g휈
sp
)
휇j
)]
dsj
+
N∑
l=1,l≠j
[
−mj휇l − sj�
(
gj
sp
(
휇ldsl
))
+ e
j
k
i�
(
gl
ss
+
(
N∑
휈=1
g휈
sp
)
휇l
)]
dsl.
15 Given the generality of our model, it is not possible to determine the sign of Ωj. To do so would require 
considering special cases involving a reduction of the model’s dimensionality. For instance, in a 2X2 case, 
if country 1 were a net importer, it would set its optimal tax lower than the consumers’ marginal willingness 
to pay for pollution abatement if: (1) 𝜇1 > 0 (which requires substitutability in consumption between com-
pensated demand and clean environment, i.e. epk < 0 and so e1pk + e2pk < 0 , as well as that production is pol-
lution intensive, i.e. g1
sp
< 0 , and g1
ss
> 0 and (2) the direct effects of a tax on emissions exceed the indirect 
effects through a change in prices, i.e. g1
ss
+ g1
sp
𝜇1 > 0 .
16 Our result is also consistent with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium carbon permit price obtained 
by  Copeland (1994) which equals the marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement to an indirect 
terms of trade effect. Again, the key difference is the term reflecting the impact of policy induced price 
changes on global emissions which arises in our model as a result of the absence of trade policy to target 
trade related distortions. See Markusen (1975) for a discussion of corrective taxation in the case of a single 
policy instrument to deal with several distortions simultaneously.
17 Implicitly, behind this is the existence of lump sum transfers between countries with the welfare of each 
country being equally weighted.
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where 훿j =
�
g
j
ss +
�∑N
j=1
g
j
sp
�
휇j
�
 . Then, for 훿 ≠ 0 , the optimal cooperative environmental 
taxes are all equal to:
which implies that the cooperative second best optimal environmental policy should be 
uniform across all countries and equal to the cumulative (global) marginal damage caused 
by an additional unit of emission. Since the marginal damage from emissions is the same 
irrespective of the sector and country that generate them, each country sets the same emis-
sion tax across all the sectors. Given free trade, the second best fully cooperative environ-
mental tax coincides with the first best policy (e.g. Keen and Kotsogiannis 2014; Kotso-
giannis and Woodland 2013; Vlassis 2013). This is because under global cooperation and 
free trade, the optimal environmental tax takes trade distortions (created by the impact of 
environmental policies on world prices) fully into account, while the implicit international 
transfers deal with distributional concerns. The full internalisation of the terms of trade 
effects then implies that the cooperative solution corresponds to that which would emerge 
if all countries were small open economies – in which case no terms of trade effects would 
be present.
In Sect. 3.3 we shall highlight the differences between the optimal policy in the non-
cooperative and cooperative equilibria. Before doing so, we now proceed to examine envi-
ronmental policy within international environmental agreements.
3.2  Optimal Environmental Policy within an International Environmental 
Agreement
We now consider the case in which a subset of countries signs an environmental agree-
ment with the aim of coordinating their environmental policy so as to maximise their joint 
welfare. We shall examine two cases: in the first, the participating countries set country-
specific environmental policies; in the second, they choose a common tax rate resulting in 
full policy harmonisation.
Denoting the participating and non-participating countries by the superscripts h and f 
respectively, the policy induced changes in the aggregate welfare of the participating coun-
tries are given by:18 
(13)
N∑
j=1
ej
u
duj =
N∑
j=1
{[(
N∑
j=1
e
j
k
i�
)
− sj�
]
훿jdsj
}
,
(14)scoop =
(
N∑
j=1
e
j
k
i
)
.
18 The policy’s welfare effects of the non-participating countries and their optimal environmental policy are 
as described by Eqs. (11) and (12).
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where the three terms on the right-hand-side reflect, respectively: (1) the change in the 
participating countries’ terms of trade; (2) the impact of policy on tax revenues from emis-
sion—due to changes in the production, and thus emissions, of the participating countries 
(directly as a result of the changes in environmental taxes and indirectly through the terms 
of trade); and (3) the cumulative impact of the policy on world emission leakage weighted 
by the participating countries marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement.
If the participating countries maximise their joint welfare with respect to country-specific 
tax rates, the optimal tax sh∗ they will set for the typical participating country h∗ will be:
where Φ =
��∑N
h=1,h≠f
mh
�
+
�∑N
h=1,h≠h∗,f
shgh
sp
�
−
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i�
��∑N
h=1,j≠h∗
g
j
sp
��
 
휇h
∗
(
gh
∗
ss
+ gh
∗
sp
휇h
∗
)−1
.
Proposition 1 The second best country-specific optimal environmental policy of an inter-
national environmental agreement will reflect the participating countries’ cumulative con-
sumers’ marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement, their cumulative terms of 
trade effects, as well as the pollution externalities arising from the change in production in 
both participating and non-participating countries.
Intuitively, maximisation of the joint welfare of the participating countries implies that for 
each one of them the environmental tax should reflect the difference between the signatories’ 
cumulative marginal damage from emissions and the country-specific effects of the tax on 
terms of trade and emission leakages. Specifically, the term 
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
mh
�
 reflects the policy’s 
effect on the participating countries’ terms of trade. The term 
�∑N
h=1,h≠h∗,f
shgh
sp
�
 captures the 
internalisation of the policy externalities between the participating countries. This term has an 
interesting policy implication: it suggests that, as a result of the policy externality, a strict envi-
ronmental policy by one member is compatible with ’softer’ environmental standards in other 
participating countries. Finally, the term 
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i�
��∑N
j=1,j≠h∗
g
j
sp
�
 reflects the internalisa-
tion of the price and, consequently, production externalities arising from all other countries. 
The discrepancy between the participating countries’ country-specific taxes reflects the inter-
country differences in the direct and indirect impact (through changes in prices and produc-
tion) of the tax on a country’s emissions, 휇h∗
(
gh
∗
ss
+ gh
∗
sp
휇h
∗
)−1
 . This highlights even further 
the fact that participating countries can set different levels of environmental taxes to address 
common targets whilst accommodating for country specific characteristics – as is, for exam-
ple, the case within the European Union where all countries participate in the EU Emissions 
(15)
N∑
h=1,h≠f
eh
u
duh =
N∑
h=1,h≠f
{
(−mh)
N∑
j=1
(
휇jdsj
)}
−
N∑
h=1,h≠f
{
sh�
(
gh
ss
dsh + gh
sp
N∑
j=1
(
휇jdsj
))}
+
N∑
h=1,h≠f
{
eh
k
i�
N∑
j=1
{(
g
j
ss +
(
N∑
j=1
g
j
sp
)
휇j
)
dsj
}}
,
(16)sh
∗
=
N∑
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i� − Φ,
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Trading System whilst retaining country specific environmental policy/targets. Similar to what 
we discussed in the previous section, in the case in which all signatories (and the resulting 
‘environmental union’) were small open economies, the absence of terms of trade effects 
would imply that the optimal policy would entail a cooperative tax rate equal to the signato-
ries’ consumers willingness to pay for pollution abatement, i.e: sh =
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i�
�
.
If policy coordination results in full perfect tax harmonization among the signatories, i.e. 
when they maximise their joint welfare with respect to a common tax rate, the optimal envi-
ronmental tax will be given by:
w h e r e 
훹 =
��∑N
h=1,h≠f
mh
�
−
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i�
��∑N
f=1,f≠h
g
f
sp
���
휇h
∗��∑N
h=1,h≠f
�
gh
ss
+ gh
sp
휇h
�−1�
 . 
As is clear from (17), the uniform tax depends on the participating countries’ marginal 
willingness to pay  for pollution reduction 
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i�
�
 , their terms of trade effects �∑N
h=1,h≠f
mh
�
 , and the externality of the non-participating countries weighted by the par-
ticipating countries marginal damage 
�∑N
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i�
��∑N
f=1,f≠h
g
f
sp
�
.
3.3  Comparison of optimal environmental policies
The differences between the optimal unilateral policy in Eq. (12) and the multilateral poli-
cies in Eqs.  (14), (16) and (17) reflect the fact that, contrary to the former, multilateral 
policies do not simply take into account a country’s own consumer marginal damage from 
emissions, but also internalise the damage to the consumers of all the countries partici-
pating in the agreement. However, whilst in the multilateral case full coordination results 
in the internalisation of all the externalities, policy coordination between the subset of 
countries that form an environmental agreement only internalises the externalities among 
member countries. In addition, the difference between the country-specific and the fully 
harmonised optimal environmental policy within an IEA—given respectively by Eqs. (16) 
and (17)—reflects the fact that the former does not only internalise the intra-agreement 
externalities but also takes into account country-specific characteristics.
As highlighted in the previous sections, when terms of trade effects are absent, as in the 
case in which countries (or the ’environmental union’) are price takers, the optimal policy 
always corresponds to the relevant consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for pollution 
abatement.
Given that in the case of full multilateral cooperation analysed in Sect. 3, the cumula-
tive impact of the externality has been fully internalised, there are no distributional effects 
across countries through the terms-of-trade channel. Instead, as is the case of unilateral 
environmental policies, partial multilateral cooperation affects the terms-of-trade, stimulat-
ing trade creation and trade diversion effects. An interesting implication of this is that the 
terms of trade effects may generate incentives or disincentives for some countries to join an 
environmental agreement, or to adopt environmental policies, to overcome the non avail-
ability of trade policy instruments in order to correct the terms-of-trade distortion. In addi-
tion, in the case of partial cooperation, in setting their optimal environmental policy, the 
(17)sh
∗
=
N∑
h=1,h≠f
eh
k
i� − 훹 ,
341Welfare and Trade Effects of International Environmental…
1 3
IEA participants’ take into account the direct impact of the policy on their emission as well 
as on the emissions resulting from changes in production in the rest of the world.
The effects of the different policy scenarios on welfare levels are not easy to quantify 
within this framework as a result of its high dimensionality. However, given the higher 
degree of internalisation of the policy externalities that  characterises it,  the multilateral 
setting ought to be dominating from a welfare point of view.19In  reality, we observe the 
prevalence of REAs over global cooperation. This may reflect the higher complexity of 
global coordination arising, for instance, from the conflict of interest among many and very 
heterogeneous countries. Clearly, however, the size of the agreement plays an important 
role in determining the level of the optimal environmental tax as it affects the cumulative 
marginal damage and the terms of trade effects. It also magnifies the externalities arising 
from the non-participating countries’ production distortions. Whether an increase in the 
number of participating countries results in an increase in the optimal emission tax level 
will depend on the balance of those effects.
4  Welfare Effects of an IEA on Participating and Non‑participating 
Countries
In this section, we examine the welfare effects of an IEA’s changes in policy on participat-
ing and non-participating countries.
Rewriting the market clearing condition in Eq. (7) as:
and combining it with Eqs. (15) and (11), we obtain
Equation (19) states that a change in the participating countries’ environmental policy will 
affect their aggregate welfare through terms of trade (via changes in international prices) 
and emission leakage effects. The first terms on the right-hand-side of the equation arises 
from the direct terms of trade effects of the IEA’s policy change and implies that there is a 
negative relationship between the change in welfare of participating and non-participating 
countries.20 This negative relationship has not been highlighted by the existing trade/envi-
ronmental literature that has only considered the case of full cooperation within global 
(18)−
N∑
h=1,h≠f
mh =
N∑
f=1,f≠h
mf ,
(19)
N∑
h=1,h≠f
eh
u
duh =
N∑
f=1,f≠h
{
−e
f
udu
f
}
+
N∑
j=1
{(
N∑
j=1
e
j
k
i� − sj�
)(
g
j
ssds
j + g
j
sp
N∑
j=1
휇jdsj
)} .
20 To see this, isolate the terms of trade term in Eq. (11) and substitute it for all the non-participating coun-
tries in (18). The resulting expression can then be substituted for the participating countries’ terms of trade 
in (15) to get (19).
19  Tsakiris et al. (2017) analyse the issue of efficiency of the non-cooperative versus the cooperative equi-
librium of environmental policy, in a two country model with capital mobility. They conclude that in the 
presence of cross-border pollution, the non-cooperative settings of the available instruments is always inef-
ficient relative to the cooperative ones.
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environmental agreements.21 However, the second term of (19) further implies that the 
overall effects of a change in policy within an IEA will not result in a zero-sum welfare 
outcome for the “world” as a whole; in other words, the magnitude of the welfare effects of 
the IEA’s policy change on the participating countries will typically not equal that on the 
non participating ones. The reason for this it that the IEA’s policy is set without internalis-
ing its effects on the non participating countries and hence on the cumulative world mar-
ginal damage; such internalisation can only occur in the full multilateral cooperative case 
where scoop =
�∑N
j=1
e
j
k
i
�
.
To emphasise:
Proposition 2 There exists a negative relationship, arising from the terms of trade effects of 
the IEA’s policy, between the participating and the non-participating countries’ change in 
welfare. Equations (16) and (17) imply, however, that the overall effects of a change in pol-
icy within an IEA will not result in a zero-sum welfare outcome for the “world” as a whole.
To gain further insights into the nature of the relationship between the welfare effects of 
the IEA on participating and non participating countries, it is useful to examine a special 
case that reduces the dimensionality of the model without altering its essential features. 
Specifically, we consider a three country two good framework in which all countries pro-
duce a clean good (used as the numeraire) and a polluting good.22 Country 1 and 2 sign an 
environmental agreement and country 3 is assumed, without loss of generality, to be policy 
inactive (i.e. s3 = ds3 = 0) . In this case, it is straightforward to show that the change in 
welfare of the participating countries in Eq. (19) can be written as
where Ξ = ∑3
i=1
�
ei
pp
− gi
pp
�
< 0 and
is the change in welfare of the non-participating country.
(20)
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22 The 3 × 2 framework is common within the customs union literature (e.g. Vanek 1965).
21 Since the negative relationship between the change in welfare of participating and non-participating 
countries arises from the terms of trade effects of the change in policy, it would not emerge in the case of 
price taking countries; in this instance, Eq.  (19) would be ∑N
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 which implies 
that the participating countries’ change in welfare would depend on their policy’s effect on their revenues 
from environmental taxation, and their consumers willingness to pay for global emission abatement.
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As in the general case, Eq.  (20) implies a negative relationship between the welfare 
changes of the participating and non-participating countries and reflects the same quali-
tative channels through which the policy affects welfare changes: the change in the par-
ticipating countries’ emission taxes will affect the welfare of the non-participating ones 
through their impact on terms of trade as well as their intra- and inter-bloc emission leak-
age effects. However, it is now easier to gain understanding of the direction of these wel-
fare changes. As discussed earlier, it has to be the case that ∑3
i=1
ei
k
− sj > 0, j = 1, 2. Then, 
as can be seen from the second and third terms on the right-hand-side of Eq. (20), a stricter 
environmental policy by the participating countries (i.e., ds1, ds2 > 0 ) will: (1) increase 
their welfare via its direct and indirect effects on own emission (since the magnitude of 
the direct effects dominates that of the indirect effects); (2) decrease their welfare via the 
terms-of-trade induced intra-IEA leakage effect; and (3) decrease their welfare via a terms-
of-trade induced leakage effect on the non-participating country. If the direct effects are 
sufficiently stronger than the indirect effects of the change in policy, the second and third 
term on the right-hand-side of the equation are positive. In this instance, a sufficient condi-
tion for the change in welfare of the participating countries to be positive is that e3
u
du3 < 0. 
As can be seen from Eq. (21), this condition will hold for a net importing country if (1) the 
direct terms-of-trade induced effects dominate the indirect ones, and (2) the direct and indi-
rect effects from terms-of-trade changes dominate the positive global pollution externality 
form the IEA. An implication of the above analysis is then that the policy’s terms of trade 
effect on a non-participating country will be affected by the country’s initial trade status.23
In general, our results suggest that an environmental policy reform that is Pareto improv-
ing for the IEA participating countries can reduce the level of welfare in the non-participat-
ing countries due to the trade creation and trade diversion effects of the policy. This implies 
that the terms-of-trade effects of environmental policy are an important channel affecting 
the incentives of countries to join an environmental agreement and can weaken the pollu-
tion haven effect. Our findings are in line with Al Khourdajie and Finus (2020) who show, 
in a game theoretic setup, that the manipulation of the terms of trade can lead to the for-
mation of larger stable environmental agreements. This line of argument can contribute to 
explain the discrepancy [e.g. as highlighted by Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2016)] between 
the optimal size of environmental agreements predicted by the standard game theoretic lit-
erature and the much larger size observed in reality as with the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and 
the Paris Agreement of 2015 that were signed by 37 and 196 countries, respectively.
5  Conclusion
This paper has developed a N-country Q-goods general equilibrium framework to analyse 
unilateral and cooperative optimal environmental policies within an environmental agree-
ment. The analysis highlights the importance of the terms of trade, via trade creation and 
trade diversion effects, for the characterisation of the optimal environmental policy and its 
welfare effects on participating and non-participating countries. The potential gains from 
increased trade may offset the increased costs of higher environmental taxes within an 
agreement. It is also theoretically possible that even when resulting in a global increase in 
23 It is possible to show that a sufficient condition for the IEA’s policy to be welfare improving for an indi-
vidual participating country is that the direct effects of the policy dominate the indirect effects arising from 
terms-of-trade adjustments.
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welfare, an IEA may lead to an overall increase in pollution, depending on the production 
structure and relative pollution intensity of participating and non-participating countries.
A key finding of this paper is that the terms of trade effects of the environmental policy 
give rise to a negative relationship between the welfare changes of the participating and the 
non-participating countries—even in the absence of zero sum welfare gains. An interesting 
implication of the analysis is then that countries may be willing to participate in an IEA as 
the terms of trade channel can contribute to mitigate the typical loss of comparative advan-
tage resulting from stricter environmental regulation.
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